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EMPLOYMENT DISCmMINATION-NLRB CERTIFICATION OF DIscmMINATORY

UNIONS

AS

GOVERNMENTAL

AcTioN-Bekins Moving &

Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 86 L.R.R.M. 1323 (1974).

A local labor union, an affiliate of the Teamsters Union, filed a petition with the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) pursuant
to Section 9(c) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)l seeking
to represent the employees of a moving and storage company. At a preelection hearing conducted pursuant to Section 9(c)(1) of the
NLRA, 2 the employer argued that the union should be disqualified
from seeking certification because it engaged in "invidious discrimination" against women and Spanish-speaking and Spanish-surnamed
persons. The Board held that it will entertain the employer's motion at
a post-election hearing, and then only if the allegedly discriminatory
union wins the election. Most significantly, the Board in dictum indicated that certification of a union known to engage in discriminatory
practices would constitute governmental action in violation of the due
process clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 86
L.R.R.M. 1323 (1974).
Victims of employment discrimination ordinarily may choose their
remedy and the forum in which to pursue it from a wide range of possibilities. 3 Employees represented by a union acting as an exclusive
1.

29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1970).

2. Id. § 159(c)(1). A labor organization seeking certification as the exclusive bargaining representative of employees in a bargaining unit under § 9(a) of the NLRA
must file a petition requesting an election. The Board investigates the petition, and, if
it determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that a question affecting commerce exists, schedules a hearing. The hearing is normally restricted to a consideration of two issues: (1) whether there is a question of representation affecting commerce; and (2) whether the employees in the bargaining unit share economic interests which make a single representative appropriate. If the Board concludes a ques-

tion of representation affecting commerce exists, it directs an election within the
appropriate unit and certifies the winner as the exclusive bargaining representative of
the employee unit. See NLRA §§ 9(a)-(e), 29 U.S.C.§§ 159(a)-(e) (1970).
3. See Peck, Remedies for Racial Discrimination in Employment: A Comparative Evaluation of Forums, 46 WASH. L. REV. 455 (1971). The possibilities include:
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-e et seq. (1970) (see Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)); Civil Rights Act of 1966, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1970) (see Bowers v. Campbell, 505 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1974); Young v.
International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971)); arbitration under the

terms of a collective bargaining agreement (Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36 (1974)); Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970) (see Corning Glassworks
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bargaining representative under Section 9(a) of the NLRA have basically two alternative remedies for relief from discriminatory treatment
in the negotiation or administration of a collective bargaining agreement: (1) an action for breach of the union's statutory duty of fair
representation in federal district court; or (2) an action for the union's
unfair labor practices under Sections 8(b)(1)(A), 8(b)(2) and 8(b)(3) of
the NLRA. 4 Neither of these remedies prevents the union from continuing to act as the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees, union and nonunion alike, in the bargaining unit. 5 In Bekins, the
Board added a third possible remedy by holding that an employer, 6 in
asserting employees' rights, can prevent a union engaging in known
discriminatory practices from obtaining Board certification as an exclusive bargaining representative.
This note will examine the Board's belated recognition of its constitutional responsibility not to encourage or sanction racial discrimination by certifying labor unions which practice invidious discrimination. Although the Board adopted a post-election hearing procedure to
discharge its constitutional obligations, its inability or unwillingness to
define the degree of discrimination which warrants union ineligibility
for certification suggests the new remedy will rarely be successfully
invoked. Finally, the note will propose adoption of a modified version
of Title V11 7 standards to enable the Board to dispose expeditiously of
the employer's charges without unduly disrupting the representation
process.

v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974)); the equal protection clause, U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § I (see Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967)); and state laws
against discrimination. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ch. 49.60 (1974).
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158 (b)(l)(A), (b)(2) & (b)(3) (1970).
5. Another alternative remedy suggested by the Board in Pioneer Bus Co.. 140
N.L.R.B. 54 (1962), decertification, is seldom invoked. Independent Metal Workers.
Local No. I (Hughes Tool Co.), 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964): see notes 37-39 and
accompanying text infra.
6. In Bekins, it was the employer who raised the charge of union racial discrimination. Possibly the Board would permit the employees to intervene as interested parties. Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 102.65(b) (1974) (pre-election procedures). For a discussion of
whether an employer has standing to assert the constitutional rights of its employees.
see Leslie, Governmental Action and Standing: NLRB Certificationof Discriminatory
Unions, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 38-47.

7.
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42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-e et seq. (1970).

Discriminatory Unions
I. BACKGROUND
A.

Unions and Employment Discrimination:Duty of Fair Representation

In the landmark case, Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 8 the
United States Supreme Court, construing the Railway Labor Act to
avoid constitutional problems,9 held that the Act imposed an implicit
duty on the union to represent fairly all employees in the bargaining
unit, whether union members or not. 10 The Court reasoned that since
under the Act the union was accorded the exclusive right to represent
the employees, the union must also be deemed to have assumed "a
duty to protect equally the interests of the members of the
craft .... ."I
The extension of the duty of fair representation to cases arising
under the NLRA was implicit in the Court's summary disposition of a
companion case' 2 to Steele, and was later explicitly extended to exclusive bargaining representatives under the NLRA. 13 The limitations of
the doctrine were identified in Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen,14 in which the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
held that a union's discriminatory membership policy was not a per se
violation of its duty of fair representation. Although the decision has
been severely criticized, 15 the court correctly concluded 16 that legisla8. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
9. An examination of the legislative history of the NLRA, read in conjunction
with Justice Murphy's concurring opinion in Steele, id. at 208 (which would have
rested the decision on constitutional grounds), supports an argument that in order to
avoid the more difficult constitutional question, the Court read an implicit statutory
duty of fair representation into the Act.
10. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Stone concluded:
We hold that the language of the Act ... expresses the aim of Congress to impose on the bargaining representative of a craft or class of employees the duty to
exercise fairly the powers conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it
acts without hostile discrimination against them.
Id. at 202-03.
11. Id. at 202.
12. Wallace v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
13. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964). See also Conley v. Gibson, 355
US.41 (1957), in which the Court extended the duty of fair representation to encompass discriminatory processing of grievances.
14. 262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959).
15. See, e.g., Trial Examiner's Intermediate Report, Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B.
1573, 1600 (1964); J. GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 185 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as GREENBERG].
16. 262.F.2d at 361.
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tive history1 7 indicated Congress did not intend to interfere with the
freedom of unions to prescribe their own membership policies.1 8
The duty of fair representation has not provided a workable solution to the problem of racial discrimination among union bargaining
representatives. As the Court recognized in Steele, the union must be
allowed some discretion in negotiating the terms it considers will be
most beneficial to the majority of members in the bargaining unit.
Variations in terms of employment among members do not per se violate the duty of fair representation unless the variations are based on
race alone or are "obviously irrelevant and invidious."' 9
Courts, faced with the problem of adequately protecting employees
from union abuse of its power as bargaining representative without
crippling union exercise of discretion and flexibility in bargaining with
the employer, have defined the duty of fair representation in broad
generalizations. The Steele formulation, which imposed a requirement
of "good faith" bargaining,2 0 interposed a subjective test of motive, a
standard hopelessly inadequate to measure group decisionmaking. A
union may decline to process an employee's grievance, for example,
due to: (1) limited financial resources; (2) a belief that the claim is

17. See, e.g., 93 CONG. REC. 4193 (1947): "Mr. Taft: ... let us take the case of
unions which prohibit the admission of Negroes to membership. If they prohibit the
admission of Negroes to membership, they may continue to do so.
18. NLRA § 8(b)(l)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(A), provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157
of this title: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the rights of a labor
organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein.
However, as the Trial Examiner noted in his Intermediate Report in Hughes Tool Co.,
147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1601 (1964):
[T] his proviso goes only to the Union's freedom from liability under Section
8(b)(1)(A) and sheds no light on its right to representative status or certified
status under Section 9 ....Whatever may be the bases on which a statutory representative may properly exclude applicants, it seems clear to me that the bases
must bear a reasonable relation to the union's role as bargaining representative
or to its functioning as a labor organization; manifestly, racial discrimination
bears no such relationship.
Practical considerations suggest that union denial of membership to blacks or other
minorities will inevitably be followed by discrimination against such persons in the
negotiation and administration of the collective bargaining agreement. Not only are
the minority workers generally outnumbered, but their exclusion from union membership bars their participation and input into union decisionmaking.
Discriminatory membership policies are expressly prohibited by § 704(e)(1) of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1970).
19. 323 U.S. 192,203(1944).
20. Id. at 204.

1026

Discriminatory Unions
unmeritorious-both of which may be permissible; 21 or (3) for reasons of racial discrimination. Unless the union is so careless as to
identify an impermissible motive such as racial discrimination, the
Steele "good faith" standard, coupled with the strong judicial presumption of regularity in union decisionmaking,2 2 effectively insulates
the union from liability for all but the most egregious conduct. 23
Subsequent elaborations of the doctrine are equally unhelpful. In
Humphrey v. Moore,2 4 the Court stated that the duty of fair representation required a union to act "honestly, in good faith and without
hostility or arbitrary discrimination"; 25 the union's decisions must be
based "upon relevant considerations." 2 6 In the most elaborate discussion of the duty of fair representation to date, Vaca v. Sipes,27 the
Supreme Court declared that "a breach of the statutory duty of fair
representation occurs only when a union's conduct towards a member
of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad
faith."2 8 Such a formulation is too blunt a judicial instrument to ferret
out sophisticated forms of racial discrimination.
Despite the continuing availability of the duty of fair representation
as a weapon in deterring union abuse of its power as exclusive bargaining representative, the doctrine has been invoked infrequently by
victims of racial discrimination for several reasons.2 9 In actions
brought to assert the duty of fair representation, defense attorneys
have utilized procedural technicalities and drawn out appeals to delay
court action and enforcement.3 0 In the field of employment discrimination, a delay in remedial action often amounts to a denial of re-

21. Cf. Vacav. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
22. Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); Pellicer v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship
Clerks, 217 F.2d 205, 206-07 (5th Cir. 1954); Wellington, Union Democracy and
Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327,
1339-43 (1958).
23. Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEX.
L. REV. 1119, 1175-78 (1973).
24. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
25. Id. at 350.

26.

Id.

27. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
28. Id. at 190.
29. M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 155 (1966) [hereinafter cited as SOVERN].
30. See, e.g., Marshall v. Central of Georgia Ry., 268 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1959);

Pellicer v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 217 F.2d 205, 206 (5th Cir. 1954).
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lief.3 1 Since the duty of fair representation is a judicial creation,3 2 there
are no statutory provisions allowing recovery of attorney fees or back
pay.3 3 Thus, the cost and delay of litigation falls squarely on those
least able to afford it-the minority workers.
The Board has utilized the duty of fair representation to prevent
34
union abuse of its power as exclusive bargaining representative,
notwithstanding the fact that Congress, when considering the
NLRA, 35 specifically rejected the Board as a federal substitute for a
fair employment practice commission.3 6 In Pioneer Bus Co.,3 7 for
example, the Board held that violation of a union's duty of fair representation would be grounds for decertification. Despite the Board's
repeated assertion of its power to decertify, however, certification has
been revoked only rarely. 38 Ordinarily, the Board dismisses the
'3 9
charges for "insufficient evidence.

31. Herring, The "Fair Representation" Doctrine: An Effective Weapon Against
Union Racial Discrimination?24 MD. L. REv. 113, 146-48 (1964).
32. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
33. Compare Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which provides for recovery of attorney's fees and back pay. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g),(k) (1970).
34. Pioneer Bus. Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962) (discriminatory membership policies violate a union's duty of fair representation and may be grounds for decertification); Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B.
181 (1962), enforcement denied, NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir.
1963).
35. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970). The NLRA was intended to promote industrial peace, not require equal employment opportunity. See 29 U.S.C. § 15 1(b) (1970).
36. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to amend both the NLRA and the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act).
29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970), to provide a measure of equal employment opportunity. Congressman Powell proposed an amendment to the Landrum-Griffin Act which
provided:
[No] labor organization shall discriminate unfairly in its representation of all
employees in the negotiation and administration of collective bargaining agreements or refuse membership, segregate or expel any person on the grounds
of race, religion, color, sex or national origin.
2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLO-

ACT 1648 (1959). Similar amendments were proposed by Congressman Marcantonio, I id. at 706-07, and the American Civil Liberties Union. 2 id. at 3635.
See generally Albert, NLRB-FEPC? 16 VAND. L. REV. 547, 549-53 (1963).
37. 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962).
38. See Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
39. See, e.g., Bell & Howell Co.. 213 N.L.R.B. No. 79. 87 L.R.R.M. 1172 (1974);
United States Baking Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 951 (1967); Comfort Slipper Corp., Ill
N.L.R.B. 188 (1955); Coleman Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 120 (1952); Virginia Smelting
Co., 60 N.L.R.B. 616 (1945). See also Trial Examiner's Intermediate Report,
Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1599-1601 (1964) (sharply criticizing the
Board's ambivalence and lackluster performance in attacking union racial discrimination).
SURE
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The Board has also checked union abuse by holding, in Miranda
Fuel Co.,40 that violation of the duty of fair representation constitutes
an unfair labor practice. Although denied enforcement by the Court
of Appeals for .the Second Circuit, 4 1 the Board's Miranda Fuel doctrine was subsequently upheld by the Fifth Circuit court in Local 12,
United Rubber Workers v. NLRB. 42 The advantages of an unfair labor
practice proceeding over an action in federal district court are pri-

marily three: simplicity 43 (any person may file an unfair labor charge),
speed and convenience. 44 The charging party, however, is limited by
the General Counsel's unreviewable discretion to initiate a formal
complaint. 45 Once proceedings have been initiated, the MirandaFuel
approach has the salutory effect of shifting all costs of litigation to the

Board. A countervailing consideration is that this approach does not
prevent a union with a history of unfair representation of minority
workers from seeking and enjoying the economic and political power
it wields as exclusive bargaining representative. Despite the availability of these weapons against discrimination, the Board's perform47
ance in this area has been sporadic46 and inconsistent.

40. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co.,
326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
41. Id.
42. 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967). The court
reasoned that the employees, in selecting an exclusive bargaining representative, effectively surrendered their right to bargain collectively with the employer (otherwise
guaranteed under § 7 of the NLRA) to the bargaining representative. The union's
summary refusal to process a meritorious grievance destroyed plaintiff's only remedy
for vindicating his § 7 rights. The union's conduct thus violated § 8(b)(1)(A) of
the NLRA.
43. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.9 (1974).
44. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 419
U.S. 816 (1975).
45. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 183 (1967); United Elec. Contractors Ass'n v.
Ordman, 366 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1026 (1967).
46. The Board's achievements in the area of racial discrimination have been characterized as "a facade of lofty sentiments," but its record is one of "distinctly minor
achievement, characterized by numerous temporizations with seemingly basic principles of democracy." Aaron & Komaroff, Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs-I, 44 ILL. L. REV. 424, 445 (1949), quoted with approval, Trial Examiner's
Intermediate Report, Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964). See also notes
29-31 supra.
47. Compare United Packinghouse Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126
(D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969), with Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202
N.L.R.B. 272, 82 L.R.R.M. 1482 (1973).
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Mansion House: A New Role for the Board

The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in
NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Corp.48 prescribes an
active role for the Board in implementing the national policy against
racial discrimination in employment. 49 In Mansion House, the em50
ployer, charged with a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA,
defended its refusal to bargain by claiming that the labor union followed discriminatory membership practices. The Eighth Circuit court
denied enforcement of the Board's bargaining order, holding the remedial machinery of the NLRA and judicial enforcement by the court
of appeals could not, consistently with constitutional guarantees of due
process and equal protection, be utilized by a racially discriminatory
union. 51 The court remanded the case to the Board and, relying on
Title VII standards and definitions of discrimination, directed the
Board to admit the employer's statistical data of racial imbalance as
prima facie evidence of discrimination. 52 The court also forbade
Board reliance on the union's passive good faith assurance of fair representation of members of the bargaining unit: "When evidence suggests discrimination of [sic] racial imbalance the Board should inquire whether the union has taken the initiative to affirmatively undo
5' 3
its discriminatory practices.
Although the Board acknowledged its constitutional obligations in
Bekins,5 4 it rejected the Eighth Circuit court's invitation to incorporate Title VII standards into its definitions of invidious discrimination.
Its own conception, however, of its proper role in deterring racial discrimination among union bargaining representatives is vague and
55
unsatisfactory.
II.

THE BOARD'S REASONING IN BEKINS

Notwithstanding the Board's acceptance of the Eighth Circuit
court's declaration that Board certification of a discriminatory union
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
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473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973).
See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 37 (1974).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)(1970).
473 F.2d at 473-75.
Id. at 477.
Id. The Board did not seek certiorari or certification in Mansion House.
211 N.L.R.B. No. 7,86 L.R.R.M. 1323, 1325 (1974).
See Part III-C-I infra.
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is state action,5 6 the members were hopelessly divided on the proper
role the Board should assume in disqualifying discriminatory unions
from seeking and holding certification as exclusive bargaining representatives. Apparently confusing a union's duty to fairly represent
members of its bargaining unit with the Board's own duty not to certify a discriminatory union, the plurality in Bekins declared the duty
57
of fair representation constitutionally, as well as statutorily, rooted.
The Board indicated the employer's charges of race and sex discrimination by the union would be investigated in a post-election hearing in
which the Board would determine whether the union's "propensity for
unfair representation"5 8 would require a denial of Board certification
to the victorious union.
Bekins reflects a conscious policy choice on the part of the Board to
subordinate labor policy as expressed in the NLRA, which encourages
prompt certification to guarantee workers the right to designate a bargaining representative,5 9 to the Board's duty not to sanction union
discrimination. 60 The Board fails to articulate any standard by which
to measure a union's propensity for unfair representation; in fact, the
Board explicitly reserved the question of what degree of invidious dis-

56. 86 L.R.R.M. at 1325.
57. Id. at 1326. As both the concurring and dissenting opinions correctly point
out, id. at 1330-31, 1332 respectively, the duty of fair representation is statutory
in origin. See note 9 and text accompanying notes 8-11 supra.
Moreover, regardless of whether the duty of fair representation is viewed as constitutional or statutory in origin, reliance on it to justify the utilization of a postelection precertification hearing is misplaced. The duty of fair representation governs the
relationship between a union as bargaining representative and members of the bargaining unit; it does not determine the Board's constitutional duty not to certify discriminatory unions.
58. 86 L.R.R.M. at 1326.
59. See NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
60. The Board has consistently asserted its jurisdiction over cases involving racial
discrimination when such discrimination threatens to interfere with employee rights
guaranteed under § 7, and to impede national labor policy. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
Presidents Johnson and Nixon expressly recognized the value of Board action in
deterring employment discrimination. Executive Order No. 11,141, 3 C.F.R. 335
(1970); Executive Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 402 (1970), as amended, Executive
Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 446 (1970). The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-e et seq. (1970), suggests that Congress was aware that
overlapping remedies existed under the NLRA, the judicial doctrine of the duty of
fair representation and existing state law. An amendment introduced by Senator
Tower to make the Civil Rights Act of 1964 the exclusive remedy for controlling
discrimination was defeated by a 2 to 1 margin. 110 CONG. REc. 13650-52 (June 12,
1964). Indeed, the statute specifically preserves existing remedies under state law. 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000-e(7), h(3) (1970).
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crimination warrants union disqualification from Board certifica62
tion. 6 1 The plurality chose to adopt a case-by-case approach:
to determine whether the nature and quantum of the proof offered
sufficiently shows a propensity for unfair representation as to require
[the Board] ...to take the drastic step of declining to certify a labor
organization which has demonstrated in an election that it is the choice
of the majority of employees.
The Board indicated it would not "regard every. . . alleged violation
63
of Title VII ...as grounds for refusing to" certify a union.

The division of opinion among members of the Board over the
proper scope of precertification inquiry into union discrimination,6 4
the recent change in the composition of the Board, 65 and the Board's
reluctance to impose the "draconian" 66 remedy of withholding certification for every alleged violation of Title VII, together with its dem67
onstrated lack of success in implementing its Pioneer Bus doctrine,
suggests the new remedy will seldom if ever be successfully invoked.
III.

SOME PROBLEMS AND IMPLICATIONS OF BEKINS

A.

Certificationas Governmental Action

1.

The state action doctrine-the general rule

The limitations imposed by the due process clause of the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution, 68 and the due process

61.
62.
63.
64.

86 L.R.R.M. at 1325 n.8.
Id. at 1326 (emphasis added).
Id.
Member Kennedy, concurring in the decision, would limit the Board's inquiry

to "those matters which we are constitutionally required to entertain," id. at 1330,
while the dissent opined that the mandatory language of § 9(c) of the NLRA deprives

the Board of authority to deny certification to a properly designated union under any
circumstance. Id. at 1333-34.

The dissent's literal interpretation of the statute was previously rejected in National Maritime Union of America v. NLRB, 267 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
65. Chairman Miller left the Board in 1975. On February 10, 1975, the Senate
confirmed the nomination of Betty Murphy to the Board. 88 BNA LAB. REL. REP. 113

(1975).
66.
67.
68.
express
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86 L.R.R.M. at 1326.
See notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra.
While equal protection and due process are not interchangeable terms, both
the same concept of fair treatment from government. Discrimination, particu-

Discriminatory Unions
and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, apply only
to governmental action, not private conduct. 69 Prior to certification as
the exclusive bargaining representative of members in the bargaining
unit, a labor union is a private organization 7 0 whose conduct, however
morally reprehensible, is not subject to the constraints the federal constitution imposes on governmental action. Although the distinction
between public and private conduct is often ambiguous, the Supreme
Court has declined to provide a specific test to identify governmental
action, preferring instead to rely on "shifting facts and weighing cir71
cumstances."
The argument that Board regulation alone satisfies the governmental action requirement was considered, and rejected, by the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Driscoll v. International Union
of OperatingEngineers, Local 139.72 In Driscoll, plaintiff challenged
a union bylaw which required all members who desired to run for
union office to sign an affidavit attesting they were not Communists,
contending that extensive regulation of labor union activities by the
NLRA constituted sufficient governmental action to subject the union
bylaw requirement to the constraints of the first and fifth amendments.
The court disagreed, reasoning that unions, although subject to extensive regulation under the NLRA, remain essentially private entities.
Only if the regulation can be said to foster, encourage or affirmatively
endorse the union activity will constitutional limitations apply.73
However, when regulation is accompanied by certification of a union
as an exclusive bargaining representative, a different case is presented.

larly racial discrimination, may be so unjustifiable that it violates due process. See
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
69. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 7 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
70. NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Corp., 473 F.2d 471, 473 (8th

Cir. 1973).
71. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715,722 (1961).
72. 484 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1973).
73. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 483 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1973), aff'd,
419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 7 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Public

Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952). In Jackson, the Supreme Court rejected an argument that extensive regulation by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission of a privately owned and operated utility company constituted state action.
Citing both Moose Lodge and Pollak, the Supreme Court emphasized that state

regulation in and of itself, however extensive or detailed, is insufficient to constitute
state action:
It may well be that acts of a heavily regulated utility with at least something of
a governmentally protected monopoly will more readily be found to be "state"
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Certificationas a stamp of governmental approval

While the Board does not affirmatively endorse the winner of the
representation election,7 4 certification is undeniably an indelible

stamp of governmental approval. 7 5 Certification of a discriminatory
union has the practical effect of encouraging and sanctioning union
discrimination in three ways: (1) it entrusts the union, as the exclusive
bargaining representative, with the economic well-being and security
of the employees;76 (2) it provides the union additional opportunities
to perpetrate invidious discrimination among employees of the bar-

gaining unit; and (3) it deters employees from seeking the aid of the
Board in opposing such discrimination.

77

Board certification also grants the union certain well-defined statutory rights which can be vindicated in an unfair labor practice proceeding before the Board and enforced by a court of appeals.7 8 For

example, negotiation of the terms and conditions of employment and
administration of the collective bargaining agreement are determined
exclusively by the bargaining representative and binding upon all

members of the bargaining unit.79 No other union may represent the
80
employees, nor may the employees bargain with the employer directly.
While employees may present grievances directly to the employer

acts than will the acts of an entity lacking these characteristics ....
[T] he inquiry
must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly
treated as that of the State itself.
419 U.S. at 350; cf. Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank. 492 F.2d 324 (9th
Cir. 1973).
74. See NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
75. See generally Weiss, Federal Remedies for Racial Discrimnination by Labor
Unions, 50 GEo. L.J. 457, 472-75 (1962).
76. Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966):
Leslie, supra note 6, at 47-50, 54-59.
77. Bekins, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1326-27.
78. See NLRA §§ 10(a)-(m), 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(a)-(m) (1970).
79. NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
80. The employee may bargain with the employers over matters not covered by
the collective bargaining agreement provided the individual contract is not inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement:
Of course, where there is great variation in circumstances of employment or capacity of employees, it is possible for the collective bargain to prescribe only
minimum rates or maximum hours or expressly to leave certain areas open to
individual bargaining.
J. 1. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944); see Smith v. Evening News Ass'n.
371 U.S. 195 (1962) (employee has standing to sue employer for violation of terms
of collective bargaining agreement).
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and have those grievances adjusted without the intervention of the
bargaining representative, adjustment cannot violate the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement then in effect.81 Thus, freedom of the
employees to engage in concerted activities otherwise protected by
Section 7 of the NLRA are severely curtailed.8 2 Moreover, the Board
has held that, in the absence of a positive showing of bad faith, the
employer may simply refuse to recognize a noncertified union, thereby
forcing the union to either become certified under Section 9 of the
NLRA or call a recognition strike.83 Finally, a certified union is protected for I year from another Board-conducted election, thus giving
84
the union time to consolidate its position among the employees.
Clearly, then, certification substantially strengthens both a union's
bargaining position with the employer and its control over the economic future of employees within the bargaining unit. The Board may
not accord such tremendous power to a racially discriminatory union
and remain faithful to the command of the due process clause of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments.
B.

Potential Employer Abuse of Precertification Challenges to
Union Certification

The Board's utilization of a post-election hearing in Bekins enables
the employer to prompt the Board to investigate charges of union racial discrimination without convincing the General Counsel to act, an
advantage over the unfair labor practice charges required under the
Miranda Fuel approach. 85 However, since representation elections are
not directly reviewable by a court of appeals8 6 and may only be challenged in federal district court in limited and extraordinary circum81. NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970); see Black Clawson v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962). The bargaining representative must be given an opportunity to be present when any adjustments are made. Id.
82. Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966).
83. Aaron Brothers, 158 NLRB 1077 (1966). See also NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).

84.
85.

NLRA § 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (3) (1970).
See note 45 and accompanying fext supra.

86.

Congress deliberately adopted a delayed review of representation orders by

permitting challenge to them only as a defense to an unfair labor proceeding when
enforcement is sought under 88 10(e) & (f) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e) &
(f) (1970). See American Federation of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940); National Maritime Union of America v. NLRB, 267 F. Supp. 117, 119-120 (S.D.N.Y.

1967).

1035

Washington Law Review

Vol. 50: 1023, 1975

stances, 87 a precertification challenge to union eligibility of certification permits employers "opposed to dealing with their employees
collectively"8 8 an opportunity to raise unfounded charges of racial
discrimination to "delay and forestall the establishment of the collective-bargaining relationship." 89
The Board attempted in Bekins to deal with the problem in a limited way. Stressing the need to conserve limited administrative resources, the Board chose to postpone consideration of the employer's
motion until after an election was held.9 0 Since unions are victorious
in only about 50 percent of representation elections, 9 ' this tactical
delay reduces the Board's potential number of hearings by one-half.
Postponement of the hearing also prevents the employer from delaying the election and raising unfounded charges of discrimination
intended to destroy the union's credibility and disrupt the momentum
of the union's organizational campaign. 92 Only the adoption of precisely delineated procedures governing the scope of inquiry and the
87. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958). In Kyne, the Supreme Court held that
a federal district court has jurisdiction to invalidate a Board certification order only
when made in excess of the Board's authority in violation of an express prohibition in
the NLRA. The Kyne exception has been narrowly construed. See, e.g., Local 1545,
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Vincent, 286 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1960); National Maritime Union of America v. NLRB, 267 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Should the Board certify a discriminatory union and the employer thereafter refuse to bargain, the employer can obtain indirect review of the certification order by
defending its refusal to bargain on grounds that it has no duty to bargain with a discriminatory union. See NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Corp., 473
F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973) (discussed in text accompanying notes 48-55 supra). On
the other hand, if the Board refuses to certify a union, the union is essentially precluded from judicial review of that decision; although NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. §
159(a) (1970), requires the Board to certify the winner of a representation election, the
courts have drawn a distinction between "statutory prohibitions and affirmative commands" and have refused to expand the Kyne exception to include instances in which
the Board disregards the statutory directive to certify the union. National Maritine Union, supra at 121. As noted by another court:
[TI he Kyne exception to the general rule that district courts do not have jurisdiction ... does not extend to instances in which the Board refuses to certify, in
spite of the positive language of section 9(c)(1) (29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)), because the command of that section lacks the clarity and specificity of the express
statutory prohibition involved in Kyne.
Office & Professional Employees Int'l Union, Local 153 v. Miller, 357 F. Supp. 220.
221 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (emphasis in original).
88. Bekins, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1335 (Fanning & Penello, members, dissenting).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1327.
91.
Note, Labor Unions and Title VII: The Impact of Mansion House, 41
TENN. L. REv. 718,736 (1974).
92. Note, Labor Law: Union Racial Discrimination:A Liberalized Standard of
Proof,58 MINN. L. REv. 335 (1973).
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quantity of discrimination necessary to bar a union from certification
93
will likely be effective in deterring employer abuses.
C.

A Suggested Approach in Investigating DiscriminatoryUnions in
a Post-Election Hearing

The Supreme Court has admonished the Board to interpret the
provisions of the NLRA in light of sometimes conflicting requirements
of other aspects of federal labor policy. 94 Since elimination of racial
discrimination is a matter of highest national priority, 95 Bekins presented the Board a unique opportunity to heed the Court's admonitions and apply the Board machinery in a manner effectuating the
purposes of both the NLRA and Title VII without unduly disrupting
the certification process. However, despite the Eighth Circuit court's
pointed suggestion in Mansion House that the Board develop "[p] rophylactic procedures . . . to deter pretextual refusal to bargain
with an authorized unit on the alleged grounds that the union is practicing discrimination in its membership, ' 96 the Bekins Board pronounced itself "after much deliberation. . . not yet sufficiently experienced in this newly developing area of the law. . . to codify, at this
time [its] approach to such issues, either procedurally or substantively."9 7
When the Board becomes "sufficiently experienced" to delineate its
approach, it has three alternatives from which to choose: 98 (1) the
formula espoused by the Bekins plurality; (2) the approach of concurring member Kennedy; and (3) the Mansion House approach incorporating Title VII standards.
93. As previously noted, the Board declined to delineate procedures to govern its
future consideration of discriminatory unions, and chose instead to proceed on a caseby-case approach. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
94. In Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942), the Court
stated:
[T] he Board has not been commissioned to effectuate the policies of the Labor
Relations Act so single-mindedly that it may wholly ignore other and equally
important congressional objectives. Frequently the entire scope of congressional
purpose calls for careful accommodation of one statutory scheme to another,
and it is not too much to demand of an administrative body that it undertake
this accommodation without excessive emphasis upon its immediate task.
95. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974).
96. 473 F.2d at 474.
97. 86 L.R.R.M. at 1327.
98. A fourth alternative, that espoused by the dissenters in Bekins, would deny
the Board authority to withhold certification under any circumstance. This approach
is untenable and should not be adopted. See note 64 supra.
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The Bekins pluralityformula

The plurality in Bekins chose to deny certification to a union which
exhibits a "propensity for unfair representation. " 99 But the standard,
as left undefined by the Board, is simply too vague. The plurality offered no guidance beyond stating that not every violation of Title VII
will disqualify a union from certification. 1 00 The plurality opinion
suggests that utilization of the propensity-for-unfair-representation
standard will require the Board to examine the probabilities that a
union once certified will abuse its duty to fairly represent all employees in the bargaining unit.1 01 Since the duty of fair representation
arises only after the union has assumed its responsibilities as bargaining
representative, a union seeking certification has neither the authority
nor the statutory obligation to represent the employees fairly or otherwise. To disqualify a union, which has won the support of a majority
of the employees, on the mere presumption that the union will disregard its obligation to represent all employees fairly seems, at best, premature, and, at worst, arbitrary and unnecessarily destructive of the
representation process. Another remedy, decertification,' 02 can be
readily invoked if the employer's prophecies of discriminatory policies
materialize and the union in fact violates its duty of fair representation.
2.

The Kennedy approach

Member Kennedy, concurring in Bekins, would restrict the Board's
inquiry to "those matters which [it is] ... constitutionally required to
entertain."' 0 3 Kennedy defined the Board's constitutional obligations
as requiring only investigation of a union's membership and recruitment policies.10 4 While this approach has the merit of being
simple to comprehend and relatively easy to administer, the Board's
constitutional duty not to sanction racial discrimination does not end
with an examination of a union's membership policies. To discharge
its constitutional duty, the Board must investigate charges that the
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

1038

86 L.R.R.M. at 1326. See also notes 8-10 & 57 and accompanying text supra.
86 L.R.R.M. at 1326.
Id.
See notes 5 & 37-39 and accompanying text supra.
86 L.R.R.M. at 1330.
Id.
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union: (1) discriminates in adoption or administration of seniority systems that perpetuate the past effects of discrimination; 10 5 (2) fails to
process meritorious grievances of minority employees; 10 6 and (3) utilizes tests or other admission criteria which bear no relation to the
10 7
requisite job skills and have a differential impact on minorities.
In short, the Kennedy approach would embroil the Board in constitutional litigation in which it has no expertise.' 0 8 To expect the Board
to grapple successfully with these constitutional issues seems impractical and unnecessary.
3.

Mansion House and Title VII standards

Adoption of the third and most desirable approach, that advocated
by the Eighth Circuit court in NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Corp.,'0 9 would require the Board in evaluating a union's
policies either to admit statistical evidence of racial imbalance between union membership and the surrounding community,"10 or to
regard union practices which have an adverse impact on minorities as
prima facie evidence of discrimination."' Evidence of such discrimination would create a rebuttable presumption of ineligibility for certification.
The Board currently uses a similar evidentiary approach when considering charges of employer discrimination under Section 9(a)(3) of
the NLRA- 1 2 When such charges are leveled against an employer, the
105. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d
980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); cf. Quarles v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968) (Title VII).
106. Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966).
107. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (Title VII); United
States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 315 F. Supp. 1202 (W.D. Wash.), aff'd, 443 F.2d
544 (9th Cir. 1971).
108. For the Board's confused handling of employer's charges of sex discrimination, see Bell & Howell Co., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 87 L.R.R.M. 1172 (1974).
109. 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973).
110. Id.at 477.
111. In McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), the Supremfie Court listed the elements required to establish a prima facie case under Title
VII. The complainant must establish:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
112. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
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Board must find: (1) whether the employer's conduct discriminates
against some employees; and (2) whether such conduct discourages
1 13
union membership.
This two tier approach can be successfully utilized in the Board's
post-election hearing under the Mansion House evidentiary standards.
When applying these standards, the Board should hold that a single
violation of Title VII is not sufficient to raise a presumption of dis11 4
crimination, without further proof of an intent to discriminate.
However, isolated violations of Title VII are rare. Most often the
union will engage in a policy of discrimination which both violates
Title VII and interferes with employee rights. In such instances, once
the employer introduces statistical evidence of racial imbalance or
union conduct which has a differential impact on black employees,
the burden of proof should shift to the union either to refute the presumption of discrimination by establishing a bona fide union purpose
or to introduce evidence that affirmative steps have been taken to
remedy the effects of past discrimination.11 5 As the Supreme Court
113. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967). In Great Dane,
the Supreme Court indicated the instances in which proof of employer antiunion
motivation is also required to establish a § 8(a)(3) violation. The Court held that if
the employer's conduct is:
"inherently destructive" of important employee rights, no proof of an antiunion
motivation is needed and the Board can find an unfair labor practice even if
the employer introduces evidence that the conduct was motivated by business
considerations. Second, if the adverse effect of the discriminatory conduct on
employee rights is "comparatively slight," an antiunion motivation must be
proven to sustain the charge if the employer has come forward with evidence of
legitimate and substantial business justifications for the conduct.
Id. at 34. Once the Board introduces evidence of employer conduct which has an
adverse impact on employee rights, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to
justify the conduct by establishing a legitimate business purpose. Id.
114. Note, Labor Unions and Title VII: The Inpact of Mansion House, 41
TENN. L. REv. 718, 731 (1974). Limited support for this assertion may also be found
in the Supreme Court's rejection of the argument "that employer conduct violates
§ 8(a)(1) of the NLRA because it violates § 704(a) of Title VII .... " Emporium
Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 419 U.S. 816, 829 (1975)
(emphasis in original).
115. Judge Lindberg's ruling in United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 315 F.
Supp. 1202 (W.D. Wash.). aff'd, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971). is a profitable illustration both of the utility of using statistical evidence in establishing racial discrimination and of ways that a union can refute the presumption of discrimination. In
Ironworkers, the district court found that the unions, in conjunction with joint apprenticeship and training committees, had utilized a variety of techniques to prevent
entry of black employees into the building and construction trades in the Seattle area.
The court of appeals noted the following union practices:
(1) the employment of tests and admission criteria which had little or no relation
to on-the-job skills and which had a differential impact upon blacks, and which
operated to exclude them from entrance into the unions or referrals to available
jobs;
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noted in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., "[t] he touchstone is business
necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice
is prohibited."1 16 Unless the union can satisfy this test, it should be
disqualified from receiving Board certification.
Adoption of Title VII standards does have several drawbacks. First,
there is the danger that the employer will raise unfounded charges of
union discrimination to delay collective bargaining.' 1 7 Even if a
charge is raised in good faith, inevitable administrative delays in conducting the hearing will result. The Board could minimize these difficulties, however, by adopting procedures to dispose of the charges
expeditiously and thus reduce any disruption to the representation

process."18
Second, the Board and the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission" 19 may find themselves reaching different results in similar cases. Moreover, as one commentator has warned, Board investi-

gation of union racial discrimination may produce "inevitable confusion resulting from two independent agencies simultaneously defining,
through decisions and guidelines, the contours of permissible behavior
and will make it more difficult for those unions which try in good
(2) the active recruitment of whites while at the same time giving little or no
publicity to information concerning procedures for gaining union membership
work referral opportunities, and the operation of the apprenticeship training
programs in the black community;
(3) the granting of preferential treatment to friends and relatives of existing
members of the unions; and
(4) the differential application of admission requirements, often bypassing such
requirements in cases of white applicants.
443 F.2d at 548. The court.ordered the unions to publicize their abandonment of previous racist policies, to provide information regarding union membership and
employment opportunity to the Black community, to offer membership to named individuals, and required the apprenticeship and training committees to increase
the number of Blacks in their programs to correct the existing racial imbalance within
the union. The court also ordered the unions to create a special apprenticeship program for Blacks with previous work experience who are unable to qualify for regular
apprenticeship programs. Id. at 548, 552-54.
116. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (requirement of a high school diploma or passing
of a standardized intelligence test as a condition of employment when neither standard is related to job performance and both operated to disqualify blacks at a disproportionately higher level than whites is a discriminatory employment practice.)
117. See Part III-B supra.
118. Note, Labor Unions and Title VII: The Impact of Mansion House, 41 TENN.
L. REv. 718, 736 (1974). The commentator suggests that the Board use procedures
promtilgated for unfair labor.practice complaints. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 102,89-.97 (1974).
119. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was created to administer
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e--4 (1970), as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (Supp. III, 1973).
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faith to comply with both. ' 120 Notwithstanding such difficulties, concurrent jurisdiction in both the Board and the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission over problems of union racial discrimination is required if the Board is to discharge its constitutional duty

12 1
under the fifth amendment.
Such confusion and possible development of inconsistent case law
could be ameliorated if the Board exercises its rulemaking powers
under Section 6 of the NLRA.12 2 The Board could not only set forth
procedures for handling employer's charges, but also effectively define
"propensity for unfair representation" and delineate the nature and
quantum of proof required to disqualify a union from seeking certifi-

cation. Rulemaking is especially appropriate in this area 23 where the
Board's propensity-for-unfair-representation standard is particularly
vague. Unions and employers alike are entitled to rules which expound this vague formulation. The Bekins Board's insistence on a
case-by-case approach is unwarranted and unsound.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Bekins raises two questions: (1) When should the employer's

charges be investigated? (2) What degree of union discrimination warrants union disqualification from certification? The Board decided the

first question in favor of a post-election, pre-certification hearing; it did

120. Comment, The Impact of De Facto Discrimination by Unions on the A vailability of NLRB Bargaining Orders. 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1383 (1974).
121. See Part II-A supra. It should be noted that denial of certification to the victorious union is not the most effective remedy in eliminating racial discrimination.
However, so long as elimination of discrimination in employment remains a matter of highest national priority, the existence of numerous and somewhat overlapping
remedies is defensible.
Professor Rosen has warned that denial of certification to unions which engage
in known discriminatory practices may result in employees being without any representation whatsoever. Rosen, The Law and Racial Discrimination in Employment, 53
CALIF. L. REV. 729 (1965). Furthermore, denial of certification will not affect the status of strong unions which wield sufficient economic power to force employers to the
bargaining table absent certification. At best, withholding of certification will require
only weak unions, when faced with the possibility of denial of certification, to abandon racist policies. SOVERN. supra note 29. at 60. See also GREENBERG. supra note 15.
at 182-83.
122. 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1970).
123. Rulemaking procedures are designed to assure fairness, encourage input
from all parties interested or affected by the Board's decision and consider all aspects of the problem before formulating a rule of general application. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
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not reach the second question. Despite the Eighth Circuit court's recommendation in Mansion House that the Board promulgate procedures to prevent unfounded challenges to union authority and implement Title VII standards to measure union discrimination, the Board
seems resolved to do as little as possible.
The greatest obstacle to effective Board action in dealing with racial discrimination among unions remains the attitude of the Board
itself. Its reluctance to assert itself in this area is understandable perhaps, for when faced with the task of enforcing inconsistent policies,
an administrative agency will naturally tend to enforce the policy involving its area of expertise. 124 The Board historically has shown little
enthusiasm for controlling racial discrimination among labor unions
when such efforts would conflict with competing aspects of federal
labor policy. 12 5 By ignoring the Mansion House standard without substituting ahiy clear standard in its stead, and by insisting on a timeconsuming case-by-case approach to the problem in the face of its
own complaints about rising caseloads and insufficient administrative
resources, 12 6 Bekins only confirms the Board's historical apathy for
playing an active role in eliminating racial discrimination in employment.
Diane Rees Stokke

124.

Enforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(d)

et seq. (1970), which prohibits discrimination in programs receiving federal funding, has proven particularly unpopular among agencies whose primary purpose is
disbursement of funds. Cutting off funds to a recipient who refuses to comply with
Title VI requirements is antithetical to the agency's primary objective. See Comment,
Title VI and the Civil Rights Act of 1964-Implementation and Impact, 36 GEO.

WASH. L. REV. 824 (1968); cf. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (1971).
125. See notes 37-39 & 67 and accompanying text supra.
126. Bekins, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1327.
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